

ACTION:

~~ER 36-5913x~~

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

Routing Slip

	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OCA	X	
2. DD/Legislation		X
3. DD/Senate Affairs		X
4. Ch/Senate Affairs		
5. DD/House Affairs		X
6. Ch/House Affairs		
7. Admin Officer		
8. Executive Officer		X
9. FOIA Officer		
10. Constituent Inquiries Officer		
11.		
12.		

SUSPENSE

~~344~~ ~~25~~
Date

Action Officer:

~~D. Series~~

Remarks:



~~22 36~~

Name/Date

STAT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	<u>D/OLL</u>	X			
14	D/PAO		X		
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

To # 13: Please respond for DCI.


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Executive Secretary

19 Dec 86

Date

3637 (10-81)



Pacific Palisades, CA
90272

STAT

December 13, 1986

Mr. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
7-E-60 HQ
Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA FILE SSCI-LR
RECPT # _____

Dear Bill,

Recent public criticisms of you by members of the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress prompt the suggestion that follows on a possible means of developing a better future relationship with those committees. My views are based on a review of the legislative oversight process during work of the Murphy Commission's Intelligence Panel (on which you served), and on my experience as a consultant to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence until Senator Durenberger became its chairman.

My thesis is that there is a gap between executive branch perceptions and legislative branch realities regarding leakage of information that would tend to risk the lives of persons involved in covert operations or otherwise jeopardize ongoing covert operations. And that this gap in perceptions/reality both induced White House orders not to provide anticipatory or after-action notice to the Congress, and mounting Congressional hostility to covert operations and to your serving as DCI.

What I am proposing is that you initiate an expedited review of the Agency-held records relating to the security record of the Congress in protecting information relating to ongoing or planned covert operations, and compare the record and the perceptions of the record of legislative security concerning covert operations.

Your predecessor, Admiral Turner, recently stated on television that none of the many covert operations conducted during the Carter administration is known to have been compromised by leaks from the intelligence oversight committees.

More recently, the Congress has adopted a procedure whereby there has been public notice (in the Congressional Record) of debates on the authorization of funds for formerly covert activities. John Bruce Lockhart, a retired British SIS officer, often distinguished between a "suit of armor" and what he called "fig leaf cover." The Congress transformed covert operations with respect to Central America from the former to the latter category, in the period 1984-1986. The results have been highly adverse. But it appears to me that various executive branch officials have inappropriately confused press leaks regarding quasi-overt operations funded through the DDO and covert operations that are not the subject of public debate.

DCI
EXEC
REG


Even the loss of life of a station chief (Welch) that has loosely been characterized as the consequence of Congressional inquiries appears to have been more directly associated with disclosures by a renegade Agency alumnus and the work of hostile foreign services. And the Congress enacted the Intelligence Agent Identities Act of 1982 to criminalize such conduct.

If a thorough review of the record indicates that the frequency or infrequency of leaks associated with the Congress relate to different categories of activity, and that the Congress has a better record in protecting ongoing covert operations than many in the executive branch have perceived, then it may be possible to provide both a better explanation of why you have been instructed not to inform the Congress of certain activities, and why it may nonetheless be prudent to keep the oversight committees better informed in the future.


Best regards,



STAT



Mr. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
7-E-60 HQ
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Pacific Palisades, CA, 90272.

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